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2UPWARD INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS:
TEST OF A MODEL
Abstract
A causal model of upward influence in organizations was proposed and
tested on a sample of staff nurses and their supervisors in a hospital setting.
LlSREL results demonstrated that the proposed model fit the data well, and
reflected a better fit than several alternative models that were estimated. The
contributions and limitations of the present study are discussed, in addition to
challenges and directions for future research.
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3Traditional conceptions of organizations suggest that influence is directed
downward, typically derived from formally designated and organizationally-
sanctioned authority bases. However, organizational scholars have maintained
interest in better understanding the processes by which influence is exercised
upward from subordinates toward their supervisors. Theory and research on
upward influence has tended to focus on how the process operates in organizations
(Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Liden & Mitchell, 1988;
Porter, Allen, & Angle, J98J; Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984), the tactics used (Kipnis,
Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Porter et aI., 1981; Schilit & Locke, 1982; Tedeschi &
Melburg, 1984), and in the conditions under which influence tactics are employed
(Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Mowday, 1978; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983; Schmidt & Kipnis,
1984). Furthermore, empirical research has investigated the effects of influence
tactics on organizational outcomes such as employment interview decisions (Baron,
1986; Gilmore & Ferris, 1989), career progress (Gould & Penley, 1984), managerial
action recommendations (Wood & Mitchell, 1981), and performance evaluations and
salary increases (Dreher, Dougherty, & Whitely, 1988; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988;
Wayne & Ferris, J990; Wayne & Kacmar, in press). Thus, while specific
relationships and linkages have been investigated, little work has been done on the
formulation and empirical testing of causal models depicting how the upward
influence process operates in organizational settings. The purpose of the present
study is to address this need by conducting an empirical test of a model of upward
influence in organizations. The model proposed and tested in this study is an
adaptation and extension of a conceptual model proposed by Ferris et al. (1989).
The following sections provide a brief overview of the Ferris et al. model, before
turning to the extended model to be tested and how it expands upon the prior
conceptualization.
4Influence Tactics
Numerous specific influence tactics have been isolated and studied in the
social psychological literature. Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) recently have
proposed a useful taxonomy for conceptualizing the vast array of influence tactics.
These behaviors are classified according to two dimensions: assertive-defensive and
tactical-strategic. Assertive behavior is initiated by the actor. presumably in
response to a perceived opportunity. Defensive behavior is reactive. typically
occurring when the actor is faced with a predicament or perceived threat. Tactical
behavior has short-term objectives. whereas strategic behaviors serve longer-term.
less clear-cut interests such as enhancing one's reputation.
The tactical-defensive category includes such behaviors as apologies.
accounts (excuses and justifications). disclaimers. and self-handicapping. Tactical
assertive behaviors include ingratiation. intimidation. self-promotion.
exemplification. entitlements (verbal claims of responsibility for positive events).
and enhancements (Jones & Pitman. 1982; Schlenker. 1980). Strategic defensive
behaviors range from learned helplessness to alcoholism and drug abuse. which are
typically seen as self -handicapping behaviors. whereas strategic assertive behaviors
include those aimed at developing desired reputational characteristics.
Conceptualization of Upward Influence in Organizations
In a recent conceptualization of social influence. the role of upward
influence and some of the factors that might encourage such behavior were
discussed (Ferris & Mitchell. 1987; Ferris et at. 1989). With the foregoing notions
in mind. Ferris et at suggested that systematic inquiry needs to proceed in several
directions to converge on a more informed understanding of the influence
construct. First. there is a need to increase efforts to better understand the
conditions under which entities engage in influence behavior. and the types of
behaviors they select in particular situations. Second. research should focus on the
5consequences of entities engaging in influence behavior, and the extent to which
they achieve the goals or outcomes they desired.
When one considers the many opportunities, rewards, and threats available
in organizational settings, it seems quite reasonable to expect that people will find
it advantageous to manage the impressions that others form of them. But it does
not occur under all circumstances, since it is likely to be intertwined in social
responses that have other significance (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Generally,
influence behaviors are most likely to occur when: (1) emotionality or task
involvement are moderate or low enough, or other conditions exist, to stimulate
self-consciousness; (2) the social interaction and work context are not rigidly
ritualized, scripted, or otherwise constrained (Le., a reasonably high degree of
uncertainty or ambiguity exists); (3) opportunities or threats create perceptions of
instrumentality of influence behavior; (4) the employee believes that he/she will be
successful; (5) when the situation and the potential outcomes are important to the
individual; and (6) when the employee observes relevant others (e.g., supervisor,
coworkers, etc.) engaging in influence behaviors, particularly when they do so
successfully.
In organizations, there are many contexts that are generally characterized
by ambiguous social or task conditions, dependency (a power difference) of the
actor on the audience, and (often) performance-related demands. In fact, some
research has reported that influence behaviors are more likely to be observed as
uncertainty in the situation increases (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Dyke, 1990; Pfeffer,
Salancik, & Leblebici, 1976). If task and situation outcomes are ambiguous, or
subjectively determined, there is more opportunity for subordinates to exercise
upward influence. Ferris et at. (1989) further proposed that formalized procedures
would reduce ambiguity and thus the perceived extent to which influence tactics
might be effective. Also, they suggested that spatial distance between supervisor
6and subordinate in the work environment would increase uncertainty, but have a
differential impact on the type of influence tactics used.
A second direction of suggested research endeavor has also produced some
results that have increased understanding of the instrumental nature of upward
influence behavior, or its consequences for attaining desired outcomes. Contextual
conditions contribute to particular types of influence behavior being exhibited.
These behaviors then elicit some type of desired response from others, such as
social or material rewards (e.g., recognition, pay increase, promotion, etc.), or
simply the prevention (or reduction in severity) of punishment. Just as contexts or
situations differ in the extent to which they encourage or permit influence
behavior, individuals differ in their propensity to behave opportunistically.
Individual Differences
Although the presence of certain conditions increases the probability of
influence behavior, employees may differ in either their ability to influence or
their interest in doing so. It is unwarranted to assume that all people have
identical or even similar upward influence goals, and some individuals are better
than others at controlling their behavior. The major individual difference variable
that implies the ability to monitor and control one's expressive behavior is self-
monitoring (Snyder, 1987). Out of a concern for social appropriateness, the self-
monitoring individual is sensitive to the expressions and self -presentations of
others in social situations. Guidelines for monitoring their own presentations come
from these social cues. That is, self-monitoring individuals are sensitive to what
others want and have the ability to control their actions to present a desired
identity (Snyder, 1979).
Evidence has accumulated that the high self-monitor is more sensitive to
social cues, exhibits higher levels of social conformity, and is highly skilled in
influence behavior. In the Caldwell and O'Reilly (I982) investigation of situations
7in which decision makers were faced with failure, high self-monitors were more
likely to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Additional field research applying
self-monitoring to impression management includes influences in job interviewing
situations (von Baeyer, Shirk, & Zanna, 1981), decision-making contexts (Fandt &
Ferris, 1990), promotion situations (Dyke, 1990), and forced compliance and
counterattitudinal behavior (Paulhus, 1982).
While not explicitly stated in the Ferris et at. (1989) model of influence,
there is some evidence to suggest that some demographic characteristics may be
associated with the demonstration of influence behaviors. For example, it seems
likely that men and women would be inclined to use different types of influence
tactics in organizations due to observation and conventional wisdom regarding
what works for each. Among others, Kanter (1977) has alluded to this issue, and
Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) reported results indicating that influence tactics found
to be effective for males are not similarly effective for females.
Research on employee age and influence tactics is noticeably absent. Since
there is a dearth of evidence on the relationship between age and influence
behaviors, there are undoubtedly many possible conjectures. However, indirectly
supporting an inverse relationship between age and influence tactics is work by
Judge and Hulin (1990) that found older workers were less likely to engage in non-
task behaviors on the job such as chatting with co-workers. Obviously, because
most influence tactics are communicated verbally, if older workers spend less time
talking to co-workers including their supervisor, they might be less prone to use
influence tactics.
Consequences of Upward Influence
The other important linkage in the Ferris et at. (1989) model concerns the
effects of influence behaviors on the attitudes and behaviors of relevant others.
Employees engage in influence behaviors in an instrumental manner, and the
8decision to engage in such behaviors is presumably based on a subjective
probability that the behavior will be effective in acquiring the valued outcome.
Clearly, this process is modeled by the decision-making processes described by
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Influence behaviors then generate effectiveness
feedback, influencing subsequent decisions whether or not to engage in such
behavior, and if so, which particular types.
However, the consequences of upward influence tactics may not operate
quite that simply or directly. Rather, it may well be the case that influence tactics
operate on outcomes through affective reactions of the supervisor. There is
general agreement that a relationship exists between the influence tactics or
strategies one uses and how that person is evaluated (Schlenker, 1980). In fact, it
has been shown that persons who demonstrate ingratiating types of behaviors tend
to t:eceive favorable or positive evaluations (e.g., Jones, 1964). More specifically,
other-enhancing communications (Jones, Gergen, & Davis, 1962), favor doing
(Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977; Wayne & Ferris, 1990), and opinion conformity
(Byrne, 1969; Byrne & Griffit, 1966) all have been found to increase liking.
Furthermore, liking has been found to be positively related to supervisor responses,
such as performance ratings (e.g., Cardy & Dobbins, 1986; Kingstrom & Mainstone,
1985; Tsui & Barry, 1986; Wayne & Ferris, 1990), and reward behavior (Kipnis &
Vanderveer, 1971). Thus, whereas it seems that upward influence tactics may well
affect liking which in turn influences supervisor responses, this linkage is missing
in several conceptual models of influence in organizations, including the Ferris et
al. (1989) model.
CAUSAL MODEL OF UPWARD INFLUENCE
A causal model of upward influence in organizations was developed based
on observations from the research literature, as well as strengths and limitations
9from the Ferris et al. (1989) conceptual model and the causal framework tested by
Wayne and Ferris (1990). This model is presented in Figure 1.
--------------------------
INSERT FIGURE I ABOUT HERE
--------------------------
The proposed causal model of upward influence in organizations extends
prior conceptualizations in several ways. First, it expands upon the Ferris et al.
(1989) model by incorporating supervisor affect toward the subordinate, which
Wayne and Ferris (1990) found to be an important variable in the reflection of
influence behaviors. In fact, it could be argued that supervisor affect is the key
variable in the causal model. It is proposed in the present model that influence
behaviors exert no direct effects on supervisor ratings of subordinate performance
and supervisor provision of resources to the subordinate. This is a departure from
past research on influence tactics, which has generally assumed that influence
behaviors operate directly on performance ratings. Rather, in the present model,
influence tactics are believed to exert a strong influence on performance ratings,
but only indirectly through supervisor affect. The key role of supervisor affect, as
an outcome of influence tactics and a cause of performance ratings, may lead to a
redirection in influence research.
A second means in which the causal model extends past research is an
attempt to be more comprehensive than Wayne and Ferris (1990) by examining
potential antecedents of upward influence, as well as the consequences, as
suggested by Ferris et al. (1989). Specifically, the proposed model specifies the
effects of two individual characteristics and two situational factors as antecedents
of upward influence, consistent with the discussion in an earlier section of this
paper. That is, self monitoring is hypothesized to be positively associated with
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upward influence (Le., both types of tactics) because high self monitors will be
more attuned to identifying influence opportunities in the work environment.
The role of employee age is less clear, since as indicated earlier virtually no
research has been reported concerning its relationship with influence behaviors.
Thus, the proposed negative relationship between age and influence tactics in the
present model is admittedly speculative, and based upon limited observation and
indirect evidence offered by Judge and Hulin (1990) cited earlier. Several studies
have reported that a greater degree of influence behavior is perceived to take
place at higher levels in the organizational hierarchy (e.g., Gandz & Murray, 1980;
Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1980), and one could reasonably assume
that position in the hierarchy is positively related to age. However, research by
Kipnis and his colleagues (e.g., Kipnis et aI., 1980) would lead one to infer that
different tactics of influence are employed in different situations and levels in the
organization. Thus, whereas older employees might engage in influence tactics, it
is reasonable that they would. engage more in the use of direct, logical reasoning
approaches than using manipulative, ingratiating types of tactics. Because both of
the types of influence tactics specified in the present model would fall into this
manipulative category, an inverse relationship with age is proposed.
Two situational antecedents also are proposed to affect influence behaviors.
Formalization is believe to relate negatively to both types of influence tactics
because it reduces the uncertainty surrounding how actions are to be taken,
decisions made, and so forth. Mintzberg's (1979) research on power and politics
has shown that political activity (influence behavior) is weakest in formalized
organizations. In such situations, there should be a lower perceived probability of
influence attempts being effective, thus inhibiting such behavior.
The effects of spatial distance also are proposed to affect influence
behavior. Spatial distance refers to the extent to which supervisor and subordinate
11
work in close proximity to one another, which presumably affects how informed
the supervisor is regarding the subordinate's work behavior and performance.
Spatial distance, then, is proposed to have differential impact on the two different
types of influence tactics. A negative relationship is proposed for the spatial
distance-supervisor-focused tactics relationship due to the types of specific
behaviors that make up these tactics. Showing an interest in the supervisor's
personal life, praising his or her accomplishments, volunteering to help him or her
on a task, and doing personal favors for him or her all involve direct contact
between supervisor and subordinate. Thus, the subordinate may see little
usefulness in exhibiting such behaviors when the supervisor is never around.
Presumably, there is little to be gained from "playing to an empty house."
Alternatively, a positive relationship is proposed between spatial distance
and job-focused influence tactics. These tactics are characterized by trying to take
responsibility for positive events that occur, making your supervisor aware of your
accomplishments, and de-emphasizing the seriousness of negative events, all of
which would be more easily accomplished if the immediate supervisor was not in
close proximity.
A third feature of the proposed model is to follow the approach taken by
Wayne and Ferris (1990) in expanding our upderstanding of the differential
effectiveness of different influence tactics. In fact, the job-focused and
supervisor-focused categories of tactics are ones developed and tested by Wayne
and Ferris (see Appendix for a complete list of the specific behaviors making up
these two categories of tactics). The notion that not all influence tactics are
similarly perceived or equally effective is promoted in the model's linkages
proposing a negative relationship between job-focused tactics and supervisor affect,
and a positive relationship between supervisor-focused tactics and affect. The use
of entitlements and enhancements (Le., behavior included in the job-focused
12
category) have been associated in prior research with the concept of self-promotion
(Giacalone, 1985; Schlenker, 1980), and such behaviors often have been found to be
ineffective, and even detrimental, with regard to achieving desired outcomes. It is
proposed here that such job-focused tactics lead to negative affect or dislike by the
supervisor, resulting in lower performance ratings and provision of resources. The
supervisor-focused tactics, involving favor-doing, compliments, and other
ingratiating behaviors, are believed to lead to more positive affect on the part of
the supervisor, thus leading to both higher performance ratings and provision of
resources.
A final feature of the upward influence model is to include a group of
demographic similarity influences on supervisor affective reactions. Demographic
similarity has been discussed relative to both influence behaviors (Eisenhardt &
Bourgeis, 1988) and affect or liking (Byrne, 1969). Thus, it is particularly
important to sort out the affect or liking variation that is explained by active
upward influence attempts by subordinates and that which is attributable to
similarity. The similarity between supervisor and subordinate regarding age, race,
and marital status are included as potential influences on supervisor affect toward
the subordinate.
The purpose of the present study was to empirically test a causal model of
upward influence in organizations. The proposed model investigates both
antecedents and consequences of upward influence tactics, and also how upward
influence might operate on individual work outcomes through the effects exerted
on affect or liking by the supervisor.
METHOD
Sample
A total of 95 staff nurses and their supervisors voluntarily participated in
the study, and the sample representatively reflects all three work shifts and most
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of the major departments in the hospital. The demographic composition of the
sample demonstrates that 91 of the participants were female while only four were
male, and 74% were married (n=70) with 26% (n= 25) not married. The average age
of the participants was 33.02 years, with a range of 21 to 55 years, and employees
reflected an average tenure in the organization of 4.87 years, with a range of two
months to 23 years. Finally, participants in the study came from all three work
shifts, but more were from the day shift than from afternoons or nights. Of the
total number of employees, 54 worked the day shift, 20 worked the afternoon shift,
and 15 worked nights.
Additionally, 28 nurse supervisors participated in the study. Of the total
number of supervisors, all were female, and they had an average age of 31.61
years, with a range of 24 to 49 years. Their tenure in the organization averaged
7.42 years, with a range of three months to 22.50 years. Average tenure as a
supervisor was 2.74 years with a range of three months to 10 years. Supervisors
reported an average span of control (i.e., number of employees reporting to them)
of 17.39, with a range of three employees to 69.
Questionnaires
Data on a number of measures were collected from different questionnaires
distributed separately to supervisors and staff nurses. The major variables used in
the data analyses are presented below, along with their psychometric properties.
Self-monitoring. A 25-item scale developed by Snyder (1987) was used to
measure self-monitoring of subordinates, a construct that assesses the extent to
which someone is aware of and monitors the social climate around them. The self-
monitoring scale consists of a set of 25 true-false, self-descriptive statements, and
was gathered for subordinates. The coefficient alpha internal consistency
reliability estimate was .73.
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Affect of supervisor toward subordinate. A three-item, 5-point scale was
used to measure the supervisor's degree of affect or liking toward the subordinate.
The anchors for one of the items ranged from "I don't like this subordinate at all"
to "I like this subordinate very much." The anchors for the remaining two items
ranged from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." The Cronbach alpha reliability
estimate was .88.
Provision of resources. Often a supervisor has several informal resources
under his or her control such as providing his or her employees with inside
information, emotional support, or a flexible work schedule. In addition, these
resources are often limited and not provided to all people. This measure assesses,
using 8 items measured on a 1-5 Likert-type scale, the extent to which the
supervisor makes such resources available to employees. The coefficient alpha
reliability estimate for the degree to which supervisors report they provide
resources to subordinates is .82.
Performance evaluation. Each staff nurse's work performance was
evaluated by his or her supervisor on several dimensions which were collapsed into
a scale; the ratings received on the specific dimensions of job knowledge, quantity
of work, quality of work, and patient relations were the basis for this performance
scale. The reliability estimate for the performance scale is .87.
Subordinate influence tactics. The influence tactics of interest included
other-enhancing communication, opinion conformity, favor-doing, exemplification,
entitlements, and enhancements. Each tactic was assessed by at least 3 items
resulting in a total of 19 items in the influence tactics measure (see Appendix for a
complete list of these items). The frequency that a subordinate had engaged in the
behavior during the past three months was reported by their supervisors on a 7-
point scale, ranging from "never" to "always". Results of a principal components
analysis on this measure conducted by Wayne and Ferris (1990) indicated that the
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24 items separated into three types of behaviors or tactics: job-focused, supervisor-
focused, and self-focused. Because the self-focused tactics scale with the current
data had very poor reliability (alpha=.34), and because many of the items seemed
to relate as much to the other scales as being distinct, the self -focused scale was
not used in the analysis. Further research needs to address if self-focused tactics
are in fact distinct from the other two tactics. The relevant items loading on the
job- and supervisor-focused dimensions were summed to form two scales. The
extent to which subordinates engaged in each of these behaviors was assessed from
the perspective of the supervisor. This was done because it was thought that with
the nature of influence behavior, those that are most likely to behave in a self-
interested manner may be the least likely to be open in their responses. The
coefficient alpha reliability estimate for these two influence behavior scales are:
job-focused = .88; supervisor-focused = .83. However, in addition to the causal
model presented later, a model using subordinate self-rating of influence tactics is
reported.
Formalization. This refers to the extent to which rules, procedures,
instructions, and communications in the organization are written, and thus the
extent to which well-defined procedures for operation, decisions, and so forth
exist. The nine-item (measured on a 1-5, Likert-type scale) formalization scale
discussed by Kerr and Jermier (1978) was used. Because formalization is
hypothesized as a perception influencing subordinate tactics, formalization was
assessed by subordinate report. This scale had a coefficient alpha of .88.
Spatial distance. A three-item measure (1-5 Likert-type scale) developed by
Kerr and Jermier (1978) was used to assess the degree of interpersonal distance
that characterized the work-related interactions between supervisor and
subordinate. Again, because it is hypothesized that spatial distance will influence
16
subordinate's tactics, subordinate reports of spatial distance were used. The
coefficient alpha reliability estimate was .80.
Background data. Additional data were collected from both supervisors and
subordinates concerning age, sex, race, marital status, tenure, work shift, and the
unit within the hospital in which they worked. Similarity was found to be an
important determinant of supervisor liking of the subordinate, therefore, race, age,
and marital similarity are included in the causal model as indicators of supervisor
affect toward the subordinate (see Figure I). Race similarity was computed as a
dichotomous variable (l if the supervisor's and subordinate's race are the same; 0
if they are not). Marital similarity was assessed comparably (I if the supervisor's
and subordinate's marital status were the same; 0 if not). Age similarity was




To test the proposed causal model (Figure 1), a covariance structure model
was employed. Covariance structure models, most commonly estimated by the
LlSREL software package, allow the joint specification and estimation of the
measurement model and structural model hypothesized to account for the observed
.
data (Long, 1983). LlSREL VI (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986) was used. There are two
advantages of LlSREL to the present study.
First, LlSREL allows the estimation of latent variables from observed
variables. It is unjustified to assume that variables in the causal model are
measured by the instruments without error. Structural relationships among
concepts are disattenuated for measurement error, providing an assessment of the
"true" relationship between the variables. Second, LlSREL incorporates structural
equation modeling techniques into the algorithm. This allows tests of non recursive
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models and models with endogenous independent variables. Because it is necessary
to estimate alternative models with reciprocal causal links, this is a key
contribution of the LlSREL algorithm to this research.
It is essential, with covariance structure models, to first examine the overall
fit of the model. If the model does not fit the data acceptably, the overall
hypothesis that the model is an accurate representation of the data is rejected. In
such a case, the coefficients estimated in the model can be biased due to relevant
omitted causes, and thus are meaningless (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982).
Several statistics provide information on the fit of the model. The most
widely used measure is the chi-square (X2) statistic. Perhaps the most conventional
use of chi-square is to examine the ratio of chi-square relative to the degrees of
freedom (Hoetler, 1983; La Du & Tanaka, 1989). Marsh and Hocevar (1985) and
Carmines and McIver (1981) have suggested that a X2/df of 2 or less suggests a
good fit. This standard has subsequently been widely employed (Ashforth, 1989;
Brooke, Russell, & Price, 1988; Schmitt, Coyle, White, & Rauschenberger, 1978).
Other conventional fit statistics include the goodness-of-fit index, adjusted
goodness-of-fit index, root-mean-square-residual, and coefficient of determination
(R2). Goodness-of-fit indices above .70 usually imply an adequate fit (Mumford,
Weeks, Harding, & Fleishman, 1988). When a correlation matrix is used as input,
root-mean-square-residuals below .10 imply a reasonable fit (Mumford et at.; Rock,
Bennett, & Jirele, 1988; Vance, MacCallum, Coovert, & Hedge, 1988).
LlSREL Results
Table 1 presents the correlations among the variables used as input for the
LlSREL VI program. Scale reliabitities are provided in the diagonals. Because of
the relatively small sample size, the measurement structure of the model was kept
as simple as possible. Each variable was treated as manifest. When the sample size
is relatively small, a parsimonious estimation strategy is an important consideration
18
because the number of parameters estimated relative to sample size is an important
determinant of convergence, standard errors, and model fit in covariance structure
models (Hayduck, 1987; Idaszak, Bottom, & Drasgow, 1988).
--------------------------
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE
--------------------------
Prior to estimating relations between manifest variables, Hayduck (1987)
encouraged the researcher to sequester error variances of concepts based on their
known psychometric properties. Accordingly, the error variances for each manifest
variable measured by multiple items were fixed at one minus the reliability
coefficient. For example, because alpha for the formalization scale was .88, the
error variance for formalization was fixed at .12. Single-item measures of concepts
(e.g., age) were assumed not to be measured with error.
Table 2 provides the maximum likelihood estimates of the influence tactics
causal model. The parameter estimates of the model indicate that neither
subordinate age nor self-monitoring were significant causes of job- or supervisor-
focused tactics. Also, formalization was not found to significantly cause the
occurrence of either influence tactic. However, spatial distance was significantly
associated with supervisor-focused tactics but not job-focused tactics. Finally, age
similarity and race similarity were not significantly associated with supervisor
affect toward subordinates. Marital similarity was found to be a significant cause
of supervisor liking of the subordinate.
--------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
--------------------------
The other causal links received clear support from the results. Job-focused
tactics led to much lower levels of supervisor affect toward the subordinate. On
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the other hand, supervisor-focused tactics led to much higher levels of liking.
High (or low) levels of supervisor affect led to high (or low) performance ratings.
Finally, supervisor affect toward subordinate and appraised performance each
were strongly associated with supervisors' provision of resources to subordinates.
By the criteria discussed earlier, the fit statistics displayed in Table 3 all
indicate that the model fits the data well. Table 3 also indicates that 46% of the
variance in the dependent variables is explained in the causal model. However.
there is considerable variability in variance explained in the endogenous concepts.
Only 5% of the variance is explained in job-focused tactics. while supervisor affect
toward subordinate (59%). supervisor rating of subordinate performance (66%). and
supervisor provision of resources to subordinate (91%) all have a high proportion
of their variance explained by the hypothesized casual influences.
--------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
--------------------------
Table 4 provides the indirect effects of job- and supervisor-focused tactics.
The stability index is less than 1.0. indicating that the model is stable and indirect
effects can be properly interpreted (Hayduck, 1987). Both job-focused tactics and
supervisor-focused tactics. although not hypothesized to have direct effects on
performance. have substantial indirect effects. As hypothesized. they are in
opposite directions. Job-focused tactics. through their effect on supervisor affect.
led to lower performance ratings. Supervisor-focused tactics indirectly led to
higher performance ratings. The same situation holds for the indirect effects of
influence tactics on resource provision. Job-focused tactics led to much lower
provision of resources; supervisor-focused tactics led to much higher levels of
resource provision. All these indirect effects are statistically significant.
20
--------------------------
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
--------------------------
As indicated earlier, the hypothesized model fit the data very well.
However, because one model fits the data well does not rule out the possibility that
other models might fit the data at least as well. Hayduck (1987) encouraged
researchers to test alternative, particularly nested, models. Nested models address
the issue if the decrease in X2 between the hypothesized model and the model with
an additional causal link added is significant. If so, the hypothesis of the original
model as an adequate representation of the data is rejected. The proper model
should include the added causal link.
Several added causal links, although not hypothesized, seemed reasonable to
investigate. For example, it is possible that supervisors like high performers,
rather than (or in addition to) issuing favorable ratings to those they like. Finding
such a link would call into Question the validity of the present model, because
supervisor affect toward the subordinate might be more of a ~, rather than
cause, of performance ratings. In response to this possibility, the hypothesized
model reviewed earlier was estimated with an added link from supervisor
evaluation of subordinate performance to supervisor affect toward subordinate.
Estimation of this model yielded a decrease in chi-square of only 0.62 with I less
degree of freedom, which was not significant, indicating that adding the linkage
from performance to affect does not significantly add to the explanatory power of
the model. Thus, the results do not support the inference that high performers are
better liked, but rather that supervisors who like their subordinates appraise them
more favorably, as hypothesized.
Another alternative model is that influence tactics predict performance
directly. This would be expected if subordinate influence tactics caused differing
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supervisor evaluations of subordinate performance without necessarily operating
through affect. For example, it is possible that defensive tactics, such as excuse-
making, may not cause the supervisor to like or dislike the subordinate, but might
lead the supervisor to evaluate the subordinate less harshly. These additional
direct links, from job- and supervisor-focused tactics to performance ratings, were
added to the hypothesized model. The decrease in chi-square with this model (2.14)
with 2 fewer degrees of freedom, was not significantly less than the hypothesized
model. Thus, influence tactics can be concluded to operate on appraised
performance only as mediated through supervisor affect. No direct links were
found to exist.
Because both evaluation of influence tactics and affect toward subordinate
were evaluated by the supervisor, it is possible that the causal direction of the
influence tactics-supervisor affect linkage instead (or also) operates opposite to
that hypothesized--that is, from supervisor affect to report of influence tactics.
This might be expected if supervisor's liking of the subordinate biased their
evaluation of the behaviors in which subordinates engaged.
This alternative model was estimated with each influence tactic. The
decrease in chi-square (decrease X2=O.63)adding a link from supervisor affect to
evaluation of supervisor-focused tactics (decrease df=l) was not significant.
Adding a link from affect to job-focused tactics also did not significantly improve
the fit of the model (decrease x2=O.53, decrease df=l, n.s.). Thus, the data support
the hypothesis that supervisor evaluation of subordinate influence tactics is not
dependent upon the degree to which the supervisor likes the subordinate.
As indicated earlier, an alternative model was estimated using subordinate
rather than supervisor reports of influence tactics. The model fit the data well
(X2/degrees of freedom=!.37; Goodness-of-Fit-Index=.894; Adjusted Goodness-of-
Fit-Index=.820; Root-Mean-Square-Residual=.084). In fact, the overall fit is very
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similar to the model using supervisor reports of influence tactics. All relationships
that were significant in the previous model were significant in this model, with
one exception. Subordinate reports of job-focused tactics, although negatively
related to supervisor affect, failed to achieve statistical significance. Supervisor-
focused tactics were significantly and positively related to supervisor affect
toward the subordinate.
As explained earlier, the slight difference between the models may be due
to the fact that those subordinates most likely to behave opportunistically may be
the least likely to be frank in self -evaluation of influence tactics. Supervisor
reports were preferred for this reason. However, the communality between the
models is evidence for the validity of the findings. In summary, in light of the
confirmatory results presented earlier on the hypothesized model--in addition to
the nonsignificant alternative links tested--the causal model displayed in Figure I
is supported by the data.
DISCUSSION
In the past 15 or 20 years, the field has witnessed some important
increments to our knowledge base concerning upward influence processes in
organizational settings. However, these research efforts have proceeded in largely
piecemeal fashion, examining a relationship here and there. While such work has
been needed and important, a more informed understanding of the dynamics of
upward influence processes in organizations has awaited the formulation and
empirical testing of causal models more precisely articulating the critical linkages
underlying this process. The present study has addressed this need by empirically
testing a causal model developed from an analysis of the research literature and
the strengths and limitations of prior research models proposed by Ferris et at.
(1989) and Wayne and Ferris (1990). The results of this investigation provide both
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convergence with some previous research concerning how the influence process
operates, and raises questions and issues to be pursued in further work.
The Upward Influence Model
The causal model testing resulted in some interesting findings. Regarding
antecedents of upward influence, only spatial distance demonstrated significant
effects in the predicted direction, and only for supervisor-focused influence
tactics. It seems, quite logically, that individuals are inclined to engage in
influence tactics directed at the supervisor only in contexts where subordinates and
supervisors work in reasonably close proximity.
Because the linkage between subordinate age and upward influence was
somewhat intuitive and speculative, it was less surprising to observe no significant
effects. However, the failure of self-monitoring to affect upward influence was
more unexpected. As seen in Table 2, the maximum likelihood estimate for self-
monitoring effects on job-focused influence tactics is in the predicted direction
and reasonable in magnitude (although it fails to achieve statistical significance).
However, the self -monitoring-supervisor-focused tactics link is essentially zero.
The fourth antecedent of upward influence examined was formalization,
and it failed to demonstrate significant effects on either job- or supervisor-focused
influence tactics. It may be the case that formalization and spatial distance are
both aspects of the work context which affect the degree of ambiguity or
uncertainty perceived, thus suggesting the extent to which influence tactics can be
effective. If this is so, perhaps spatial distance simply overwhelms formalization
in an individual's determination of influence tactics usage.
The paths from both job-focused and supervisor-focused influence tactics to
supervisor affect toward subordinate were both strongly supported in the predicted
direction. These results are supportive of the findings reported recently by Wayne
and Ferris (I990) regarding supervisor-focused influence tactics, but are
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inconsistent with respect to job-focused tactics. Whereas the present results show a
significant negative causal link from job-focused tactics to supervisor affect
toward subordinate, Wayne and Ferris (1990) reported a near significant (p<.10)
linkage for job-focused tactics, but in the positive not negative direction. These
differences could be a function of the different occupational groups sampled in
the Wayne and Ferris (bank employees) and the present (staff nurses) studies.
Grabbing responsibility for positive events and other self -enhancements may
simply be less tolerated by supervisors in the nursing profession, whose roots trace
to the example of the Good Samaritan (Dolan, Fitzpatrick, & Herrmann, 1983).
Alternatively, the differences in results could be due to the sources used for
reporting influence tactics in the two studies, which is discussed in more detail
below.
A series of demographic similarity variables were tested in this causal
model in order to address the possible influences of similarity on liking, which
may go beyond the liking variance accounted for by influence tactics. It was
found that whereas the age and race similarity paths were not significant, the
marital similarity linkage was significant. The failure of the race similarity path
to achieve significance is understandable given the poor distribution of the
variable. Because so few members of the sample were black (5%), the low base rate
of the variable likely attenuated its correlation with other variables. The reason
for the nonsignificant age similarity to supervisor affect path is less clear.
A final set of linkages examined in the present causal model involved
supervisor affect toward subordinate influences on performance ratings and
provision of resources, and the effects of performance ratings on provision of
resources. All three of these paths indicated strong support for the predictions.
The first two of these three significant linkages even more firmly establish the
findings from prior research that supervisor affect toward subordinate is related
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positively to the supervisors' ratings of subordinate performance (e.g., Cardy &
Dobbins, 1986; Kingstrom & Mainstone, 1985; Tsui & Barry. 1986; Wayne & Ferris.
1990). and to allocation of rewards or resources (Kipnis & Vanderveer. 1971).
This third linkage. between supervisor ratings of subordinate performance
and supervisor provision of resources to subordinate. has both logical, and prior
research. support. It makes sense. in organizations. that resources should be
allocated differentially on the basis of a legitimate criterion such as performance.
In fact. the very basis of performance-based reward systems assumes the accurate
assessment of "objective performance," followed by the allocation of resources and
rewards based on that performance assessment. However, where this assumption
breaks down is in the accurate assessment of "objective performance," which for
most jobs simply does not exist. Rather. performance level can only be known
through the supervisor's subjective evaluation, which can be substantially
influenced by affective reactions to the subordinate. further affected by influence
tactics displayed by the subordinate. All of this suggests, of course, that even
though reward and resource allocation appears to be based solely on performance
and not a result of interpersonal influence. we may find that influence simply
enters the equation at an earlier point to affect outcomes.
Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research
The present study makes contributions to our understanding of upward
influence processes in several ways. The causal model tested is more inclusive than
the Wayne and Ferris (1990) model, by including antecedents of upward influence
as well as mediating variables and consequences. In so doing, the present model
also extends the Ferris et al. (1989) conceptual model in an informed way.
A perhaps more important contribution of this study concerns the
methodology employed to gather upward influence information. A potential
problem in the study of "sensitive" topics like upward influence is the possibility
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of social desirability in responses when the actor or influencer is asked to self-
report on the extent to which he or she engages in a series of influence tactics.
Such use of the actor as the exclusive source of information regarding influence
tactics presumably could affect the validity of the results, yet this approach has
been employed in prior research (e.g., Wayne & Ferris, 1990) for at least two
reasons. First, it is often quite difficult or impossible to obtain information from
alternative sources in organizational field research. Second, despite potential
problems, using the actor or influencer as the source of information on influence
tactics has some merit, and while socially desirable response bias might pose a
potential problem in using actor sources of influence tactics, it has not been
empirically substantiated to date.
The present study tested this notion be assessing upward influence tactics
from both the actor/subordinate and the target/supervisor, and estimated separate
models using each source. Essentially, the results of the two model estimation
procedures were similar, with one exception. In the model using the subordinate as
the source of upward influence tactics, the linkage between job-focused influence
tactics and supervisor affect toward subordinate was not statistically significant,
though it was negative as predicted. These results mirror those reported by Wayne
and Ferris (1990) in which the subordinate also was used as the source of influence
tactics. There do then appear to be differences in the results of research that
employ different sources of influence tactics. When subordinates, the perpetrators
of influence tactics, are used, supervisor-focused but not job-focused tactics affect
supervisor liking, as found by Wayne and Ferris and in the present study when the
alternative source model was estimated. When supervisors are used as information
sources on influence tactics, both supervisor- and job-focused tactics significantly
affect supervisor liking of the subordinate, but in different directions. These
results using the supervisor as the information source in the present study have
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recently been replicated by Valerius (1990) on a sample of city parks and
recreation department managers.
Despite the contributions, the present research is not without its limitations.
In this study, performance of the subordinate was measured by supervisor ratings
(which was appropriate given the way the upward influence process was modeled
and that performance is typically assessed in this manner in organizations).
However, it would be desirable to have an "objective" measure of subordinate
performance available against which to validate the present results. For example,
it could be the case that "objective" poor-performing subordinates tend to make
disproportionate use of job-focused upward influence tactics which result in
supervisors liking them less and assigning them lower performance ratings. And,
"objective" high-performing subordinates may make greater use of supervisor-
focused influence tactics resulting in greater liking by supervisor and higher
performance ratings. If this was the case, "objective" performance would be
confounded with upward influence tactics, and it would be impossible to
disentangle the effects. Unfortunately, for many jobs, "objective" measures of
performance simply do not exist, making this issue highly problematic and
difficult to address. Although some efforts were made in the present study to
gather follow-up data, from non-participant sources, on the performance of
employees who took part in this research, and the limited data gathered suggested
no systematic differences in performance, these efforts provided only sketchy
information and are not sufficient to discount this alternative explanation.
A second issue represents both a limitation of the present study and a
direction for future research; that is, the cross-sectional nature of the research
design. While much can be learned from cross-sectional research, and such research
has yielded useful results in this area, we need to design longitudinal research in
order to develop a more informed understanding of how upward influence
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processes operate over time. It seems likely that employees draw upon a diversified
portfolio of influence tactics to manage impressions over their careers, and
examinations of the differential use and effectiveness of these tactics over an
extended period of time are best investigated using longitudinal research designs.
Future research in this area needs to investigate how upward influence
tactics affect other types of human resources decisions and activities beside the
performance evaluation process. Some efforts have been made to examine the
effects of influence tactics on employment interviewer decisions (e.g., Baron, 1986;
Gilmore & Ferris, 1989), career progress (e.g., Gould & Penley, 1984), and pay
increase decisions (e.g., Dreher, Dougherty, & Whitely, 1988; Kipnis & Schmidt,
1988). Further research is needed in these and other areas, such as promotion
decisions. Furthermore, efforts need to focus on competitive tests of different
types of influence tactics so we can increase our understanding of the
effectiveness of different types of tactics in different situations.
In conclusion, a final issue is raised that poses a challenge for, and bears
consideration by, anyone pursuing research in this area; that is, the issue of
intentionality of the observed influence behaviors. As researchers, we often may
assume that when a person demonstrates a behavior we have defined as an
influence tactic, that person is necessarily doing so with the intention to
manipulate and opportunistically bring about some valued and desired outcome.
Until we design research (if possible) to expressly address the intentionality issue,
we must be cautious in making such unfounded assumptions. It could be the case,
for example, that some of the behaviors that make up the supervisor-focused
category (e.g., favor-doing, volunteer to help supervisor, show a personal interest in
supervisor) are interpreted by some employees and supervisors not as efforts to
manipulate for personal gain, but as what an employee is supposed to do as part of
regular work behavior. In fact, it is quite likely that supervisors observing the
same behavior, but inferring different intentionality on the part of the actor,
would respond Quite differently.
Hopefully, the present study and the foregoing discussion of issues and
challenges will serve to stimulate more research on upward influence in
organizations. Progress has been made in developing a better understanding of this
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12




3 Job-Focused Tactics -49 -30 88
4 Supervisor-Focused Tactics 47 40 16 83
5 Provision of Resources 78 75 -30 29 82
6 Subordinate Self-monitoring -11 13 14 05 -02 73
7 Subordinate Age -03 -18 -06 -28 08 -21
8 Spatial Distance -25 -26 -01 -46 -09 00 33 80
9 Formalization -02 -12 08 11 07 00 -07 -12 88
10 Age Similarity -08 -09 -11 -33 -02 -12 58 28 -08
11 Race Similarity -06 14 22 21 -05 15 -07 -13 08 -03
12 Marital Similarity 30 33 -20 06 30 -07 05 00 -09 07 11
NOTE: Decimals are omitted. Scale re1iabi1ities are in diagonals.
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TABLE 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Structural Model
Path Parameter Estimate
Subordinate Self-Monitoring to Job-Focused Tactics .19 (.13)+
.09 (.12)Subordinate Self-Monitoring to Supervisor-Focused Tactics
Subordinate Age to Job-Focused Tactics
- .02 (.13)
- . 06 (. 11)Subordinate Age to Supervisor-Focused Tactics
Spatial Distance to Job-Focused Tactics -.05 (.14)
-.53 (.12)**Spatial Distance to Supervisor-Focused Tactics
Formalization to Job-Focused Tactics .03 (.12)
.09 (.11)Formalization to Supervisor-Focused Tactics
Job-Focused Tactics to Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate -.48 (.10)**
Supervisor-Focused Tactics to
Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate . 64 (. 11) **
Race Similarity to Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate
.05 (.09)
.01 (.09)
Age Similarity to Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate
Marital Similarity to Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate .21 (.09)**
Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate to
Supervisor Rating of Subordinate Performance .78 (.09)**
Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate to
Supervisor Provision of Resources to Subordinate .40 (.14)**
Supervisor Rating of Subordinate Performance to
Supervisor Provision of Resources to Subordinate .56 (.15)**
NOTE: + P < .10 * P <.05 **p <.01
Standard errors are in parentheses. All tests are one-tailed.
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TABLE 3
Fit Statistics of Structural Model
Statistic Value
Chi-Square 64.26
Degrees of Freedom 48
X2/df 1.34
Goodness-of-Fit Index .887
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index .816
Root-Mean-Square-Residua1 .089
Overall Coefficient of Determination .463




Supervisor Affect Toward Subordinate .588
Supervisor Rating of Subordinate Performance .656









Indirect Effects of Job and Supervisor-Focused Tactics
Supervisor-Focused Tactics to Supervisor
Rating of Subordinate Performance
Path
Job-Focused Tactics to Supervisor
Rating of Subordinate Performance
Job-Focused Tactics to Supervisor
Provision of Resources to Subordinate
Supervisor-Focused Tactics to Supervisor
Provision of Resources to Subordinate






















Job-Focused and Supervisor-Focused Influence Tactics
Job-Focused Tactics
Play up the value of a positive event that you have taken credit for.
Try to make a positive event that you are responsible fro appear greater than it actually is.
Try to take responsibility for positive events, even when you are not solely responsible.
Try to make a negative event that you are responsible for not appear as severe as it actually is to your
supervisor.
Try to let your supervisor think that you are responsible for positive events that occur in your work
group.
Arrive at work early in order to look good in front of your supervisor.
Work late at the office so that your supervisor will see you working late and think that you are a hard
worker.
Make your supervisor aware of your accomplishments.
Agree with your immediate supervisor's major opinions outwardly even when you disagree inwardly.
Create the impression that you are a "good" person to your supervisor.
Disagree with your supervisor on maior issues.
Take responsibility for negative events, even when you are not solely responsible.
SUDervisor- Focused Tactics
Take an interest in your immediate supervisor's personal life.
Praise your immediate supervisor on his or her accomplishments.
Do personal favors for your supervisor.
Offer to do something for your supervisor which you were not required to do; that is, you did it as a
personal favor for him or her.
Volunteer to help your immediate supervisor on a task.
Compliment your immediate supervisor on his or her dress or appearance.
Agree with your supervisor's major ideas.
